From vda.linux at googlemail.com  Sun May  1 00:06:20 2022
From: vda.linux at googlemail.com (Denys Vlasenko)
Date: Sun, 1 May 2022 02:06:20 +0200
Subject: [git commit] seedrng: do not hash lengths, they are very predictable
Message-ID: <20220501001126.52C2784BDC@busybox.osuosl.org>

commit: https://git.busybox.net/busybox/commit/?id=74716580380d609165cc0be1ae37ee52d77243b2
branch: https://git.busybox.net/busybox/commit/?id=refs/heads/master

function                                             old     new   delta
seedrng_main                                         982     930     -52

Signed-off-by: Denys Vlasenko <vda.linux at googlemail.com>
---
 util-linux/seedrng.c | 8 +++++---
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/util-linux/seedrng.c b/util-linux/seedrng.c
index 3074e9a58..2965f3d47 100644
--- a/util-linux/seedrng.c
+++ b/util-linux/seedrng.c
@@ -151,7 +151,8 @@ static void seed_from_file_if_exists(const char *filename, int dfd, bool credit,
 		 */
 		fsync(dfd);
 
-		sha256_hash(hash, &seed_len, sizeof(seed_len));
+//Length is not random, and taking its address spills variable to stack
+//		sha256_hash(hash, &seed_len, sizeof(seed_len));
 		sha256_hash(hash, seed, seed_len);
 		printf("Seeding %u bits %s crediting\n",
 				(unsigned)seed_len * 8, credit ? "and" : "without");
@@ -220,7 +221,8 @@ int seedrng_main(int argc UNUSED_PARAM, char *argv[])
 
 	new_seed_len = determine_optimal_seed_len();
 	new_seed_creditable = read_new_seed(new_seed, new_seed_len);
-	sha256_hash(&hash, &new_seed_len, sizeof(new_seed_len));
+//Length is not random, and taking its address spills variable to stack
+//	sha256_hash(&hash, &new_seed_len, sizeof(new_seed_len));
 	sha256_hash(&hash, new_seed, new_seed_len);
 	sha256_end(&hash, new_seed + new_seed_len - SHA256_OUTSIZE);
 
@@ -230,7 +232,7 @@ int seedrng_main(int argc UNUSED_PARAM, char *argv[])
 	xwrite(fd, new_seed, new_seed_len);
 	if (new_seed_creditable) {
 		/* More paranoia when we create a file which we believe contains
-		 * genuine entropy: make sure disk is not full, quota was't esceeded, etc:
+		 * genuine entropy: make sure disk is not full, quota was't exceeded, etc:
 		 */
 		if (fsync(fd) < 0)
 			bb_perror_msg_and_die("can't write '%s'", NON_CREDITABLE_SEED_NAME);

From vda.linux at googlemail.com  Sun May  1 14:37:39 2022
From: vda.linux at googlemail.com (Denys Vlasenko)
Date: Sun, 1 May 2022 16:37:39 +0200
Subject: [git commit] seedrng: reduce MAX_SEED_LEN from 512 to 256
Message-ID: <20220501145552.1F60884C4E@busybox.osuosl.org>

commit: https://git.busybox.net/busybox/commit/?id=b5624be6df95fd26d19051af5d02001bbe8f2dd8
branch: https://git.busybox.net/busybox/commit/?id=refs/heads/master

As proposed by Jason.
getrandom() is more likely to block on reads larger than this.

Signed-off-by: Denys Vlasenko <vda.linux at googlemail.com>
---
 util-linux/seedrng.c | 6 +++++-
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/util-linux/seedrng.c b/util-linux/seedrng.c
index 2965f3d47..04e52a996 100644
--- a/util-linux/seedrng.c
+++ b/util-linux/seedrng.c
@@ -56,7 +56,11 @@
 
 enum {
 	MIN_SEED_LEN = SHA256_OUTSIZE,
-	MAX_SEED_LEN = 512
+	/* kernels < 5.18 could return short reads from getrandom()
+	 * if signal is pending and length is > 256.
+	 * Let's limit our reads to 256 bytes.
+	 */
+	MAX_SEED_LEN = 256,
 };
 
 static size_t determine_optimal_seed_len(void)

From vda.linux at googlemail.com  Sun May  1 14:51:06 2022
From: vda.linux at googlemail.com (Denys Vlasenko)
Date: Sun, 1 May 2022 16:51:06 +0200
Subject: [git commit] seedrng: shorten --help, assorted small cleanups
Message-ID: <20220501145552.2B16684BD8@busybox.osuosl.org>

commit: https://git.busybox.net/busybox/commit/?id=54867fec12e23a0606fd74e999ee30e34eea6a74
branch: https://git.busybox.net/busybox/commit/?id=refs/heads/master

function                                             old     new   delta
packed_usage                                       34295   34290      -5

Signed-off-by: Denys Vlasenko <vda.linux at googlemail.com>
---
 util-linux/seedrng.c | 21 ++++++++++-----------
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)

diff --git a/util-linux/seedrng.c b/util-linux/seedrng.c
index 04e52a996..390dec12a 100644
--- a/util-linux/seedrng.c
+++ b/util-linux/seedrng.c
@@ -19,9 +19,8 @@
  *
  * This is based on code from <https://git.zx2c4.com/seedrng/about/>.
  */
-
 //config:config SEEDRNG
-//config:	bool "seedrng (2 kb)"
+//config:	bool "seedrng (1.3 kb)"
 //config:	default y
 //config:	help
 //config:	Seed the kernel RNG from seed files, meant to be called
@@ -33,12 +32,12 @@
 //kbuild:lib-$(CONFIG_SEEDRNG) += seedrng.o
 
 //usage:#define seedrng_trivial_usage
-//usage:	"[-d SEED_DIRECTORY] [-n]"
+//usage:	"[-d DIR] [-n]"
 //usage:#define seedrng_full_usage "\n\n"
 //usage:	"Seed the kernel RNG from seed files"
 //usage:	"\n"
-//usage:	"\n	-d DIR	Use seed files from DIR (default: /var/lib/seedrng)"
-//usage:	"\n	-n	Skip crediting seeds, even if creditable"
+//usage:	"\n	-d DIR	Use seed files in DIR (default: /var/lib/seedrng)"
+//usage:	"\n	-n	Do not credit randomness, even if creditable"
 
 #include "libbb.h"
 
@@ -50,8 +49,8 @@
 #define GRND_INSECURE 0x0004 /* Apparently some headers don't ship with this yet. */
 #endif
 
-#define DEFAULT_SEED_DIR "/var/lib/seedrng"
-#define CREDITABLE_SEED_NAME "seed.credit"
+#define DEFAULT_SEED_DIR         "/var/lib/seedrng"
+#define CREDITABLE_SEED_NAME     "seed.credit"
 #define NON_CREDITABLE_SEED_NAME "seed.no-credit"
 
 enum {
@@ -75,7 +74,7 @@ static size_t determine_optimal_seed_len(void)
 		return MIN_SEED_LEN;
 	}
 	poolsize_str[n] = '\0';
-	poolsize = (bb_strtoul(poolsize_str, NULL, 10) + 7) / 8;
+	poolsize = (bb_strtou(poolsize_str, NULL, 10) + 7) / 8;
 	return MAX(MIN(poolsize, MAX_SEED_LEN), MIN_SEED_LEN);
 }
 
@@ -164,8 +163,8 @@ static void seed_from_file_if_exists(const char *filename, int dfd, bool credit,
 	}
 }
 
-int seedrng_main(int argc, char *argv[]) MAIN_EXTERNALLY_VISIBLE;
-int seedrng_main(int argc UNUSED_PARAM, char *argv[])
+int seedrng_main(int argc, char **argv) MAIN_EXTERNALLY_VISIBLE;
+int seedrng_main(int argc UNUSED_PARAM, char **argv)
 {
 	const char *seed_dir;
 	int fd, dfd;
@@ -236,7 +235,7 @@ int seedrng_main(int argc UNUSED_PARAM, char *argv[])
 	xwrite(fd, new_seed, new_seed_len);
 	if (new_seed_creditable) {
 		/* More paranoia when we create a file which we believe contains
-		 * genuine entropy: make sure disk is not full, quota was't exceeded, etc:
+		 * genuine entropy: make sure disk is not full, quota isn't exceeded, etc:
 		 */
 		if (fsync(fd) < 0)
 			bb_perror_msg_and_die("can't write '%s'", NON_CREDITABLE_SEED_NAME);

From vda.linux at googlemail.com  Sun May  1 15:02:20 2022
From: vda.linux at googlemail.com (Denys Vlasenko)
Date: Sun, 1 May 2022 17:02:20 +0200
Subject: [git commit] seedrng: manually inline seed_rng
Message-ID: <20220501145552.3549484C52@busybox.osuosl.org>

commit: https://git.busybox.net/busybox/commit/?id=a157c4c978d3e984f3cb7e2fc02d5ce428d5f82e
branch: https://git.busybox.net/busybox/commit/?id=refs/heads/master

We can now remove a separate buffer

function                                             old     new   delta
seedrng_main                                         930     884     -46

Signed-off-by: Bernhard Reutner-Fischer <rep.dot.nop at gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Denys Vlasenko <vda.linux at googlemail.com>
---
 util-linux/seedrng.c | 36 +++++++++++++++---------------------
 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)

diff --git a/util-linux/seedrng.c b/util-linux/seedrng.c
index 390dec12a..8c81835f6 100644
--- a/util-linux/seedrng.c
+++ b/util-linux/seedrng.c
@@ -112,31 +112,16 @@ static bool read_new_seed(uint8_t *seed, size_t len)
 	return is_creditable;
 }
 
-static void seed_rng(uint8_t *seed, size_t len, bool credit)
+static void seed_from_file_if_exists(const char *filename, int dfd, bool credit, sha256_ctx_t *hash)
 {
 	struct {
 		int entropy_count;
 		int buf_size;
-		uint8_t buffer[MAX_SEED_LEN];
+		uint8_t buf[MAX_SEED_LEN];
 	} req;
-	int random_fd;
-
-	req.entropy_count = credit ? len * 8 : 0;
-	req.buf_size = len;
-	memcpy(req.buffer, seed, len);
-
-	random_fd = xopen("/dev/urandom", O_RDONLY);
-	xioctl(random_fd, RNDADDENTROPY, &req);
-	if (ENABLE_FEATURE_CLEAN_UP)
-		close(random_fd);
-}
-
-static void seed_from_file_if_exists(const char *filename, int dfd, bool credit, sha256_ctx_t *hash)
-{
-	uint8_t seed[MAX_SEED_LEN];
 	ssize_t seed_len;
 
-	seed_len = open_read_close(filename, seed, sizeof(seed));
+	seed_len = open_read_close(filename, req.buf, sizeof(req.buf));
 	if (seed_len < 0) {
 		if (errno != ENOENT)
 			bb_perror_msg_and_die("can't read '%s'", filename);
@@ -144,6 +129,8 @@ static void seed_from_file_if_exists(const char *filename, int dfd, bool credit,
 	}
 	xunlink(filename);
 	if (seed_len != 0) {
+		int fd;
+
 		/* We are going to use this data to seed the RNG:
 		 * we believe it to genuinely containing entropy.
 		 * If this just-unlinked file survives
@@ -156,10 +143,17 @@ static void seed_from_file_if_exists(const char *filename, int dfd, bool credit,
 
 //Length is not random, and taking its address spills variable to stack
 //		sha256_hash(hash, &seed_len, sizeof(seed_len));
-		sha256_hash(hash, seed, seed_len);
+		sha256_hash(hash, req.buf, seed_len);
+
+		req.buf_size = seed_len;
+		seed_len *= 8;
+		req.entropy_count = credit ? seed_len : 0;
 		printf("Seeding %u bits %s crediting\n",
-				(unsigned)seed_len * 8, credit ? "and" : "without");
-		seed_rng(seed, seed_len, credit);
+				(unsigned)seed_len, credit ? "and" : "without");
+		fd = xopen("/dev/urandom", O_RDONLY);
+		xioctl(fd, RNDADDENTROPY, &req);
+		if (ENABLE_FEATURE_CLEAN_UP)
+			close(fd);
 	}
 }
 

From vda.linux at googlemail.com  Sun May  1 15:06:00 2022
From: vda.linux at googlemail.com (Denys Vlasenko)
Date: Sun, 1 May 2022 17:06:00 +0200
Subject: [git commit] style fix
Message-ID: <20220501145552.4038484C4E@busybox.osuosl.org>

commit: https://git.busybox.net/busybox/commit/?id=9b6f44e0403f9214343bdafd054a628aa1506630
branch: https://git.busybox.net/busybox/commit/?id=refs/heads/master

Signed-off-by: Denys Vlasenko <vda.linux at googlemail.com>
---
 examples/shutdown-1.0/script/hardshutdown.c | 2 +-
 libbb/appletlib.c                           | 2 +-
 networking/httpd_indexcgi.c                 | 2 +-
 networking/httpd_ssi.c                      | 2 +-
 printutils/lpd.c                            | 4 ++--
 printutils/lpr.c                            | 4 ++--
 shell/match.c                               | 2 +-
 7 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)

diff --git a/examples/shutdown-1.0/script/hardshutdown.c b/examples/shutdown-1.0/script/hardshutdown.c
index c21ddad58..b4af26f0f 100644
--- a/examples/shutdown-1.0/script/hardshutdown.c
+++ b/examples/shutdown-1.0/script/hardshutdown.c
@@ -102,7 +102,7 @@ enum action_t {
 	REBOOT
 };
 
-int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+int main(int argc, char **argv)
 {
 	struct timespec t = {0,0};
 	enum action_t action = SHUTDOWN;
diff --git a/libbb/appletlib.c b/libbb/appletlib.c
index 841b3b873..d8ab2a450 100644
--- a/libbb/appletlib.c
+++ b/libbb/appletlib.c
@@ -762,7 +762,7 @@ get_script_content(unsigned n)
 //usage:#define busybox_trivial_usage NOUSAGE_STR
 //usage:#define busybox_full_usage ""
 //applet:IF_BUSYBOX(IF_FEATURE_SH_STANDALONE(IF_FEATURE_TAB_COMPLETION(APPLET(busybox, BB_DIR_BIN, BB_SUID_MAYBE))))
-int busybox_main(int argc, char *argv[]) MAIN_EXTERNALLY_VISIBLE;
+int busybox_main(int argc, char **argv) MAIN_EXTERNALLY_VISIBLE;
 #  else
 #   define busybox_main(argc,argv) busybox_main(argv)
 static
diff --git a/networking/httpd_indexcgi.c b/networking/httpd_indexcgi.c
index 47b1159f4..edaaad566 100644
--- a/networking/httpd_indexcgi.c
+++ b/networking/httpd_indexcgi.c
@@ -211,7 +211,7 @@ static void fmt_04u(/*char *dst,*/ unsigned n)
 	fmt_02u(n % 100);
 }
 
-int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+int main(int argc, char **argv)
 {
 	dir_list_t *dir_list;
 	dir_list_t *cdir;
diff --git a/networking/httpd_ssi.c b/networking/httpd_ssi.c
index 4bd9a6d97..620b96332 100644
--- a/networking/httpd_ssi.c
+++ b/networking/httpd_ssi.c
@@ -143,7 +143,7 @@ static void process_includes(const char *filename)
 	fclose(fp);
 }
 
-int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+int main(int argc, char **argv)
 {
 	if (!argv[1])
 		return 1;
diff --git a/printutils/lpd.c b/printutils/lpd.c
index e48feef90..34e5ea209 100644
--- a/printutils/lpd.c
+++ b/printutils/lpd.c
@@ -114,8 +114,8 @@ static char *xmalloc_read_stdin(void)
 	return xmalloc_reads(STDIN_FILENO, &max);
 }
 
-int lpd_main(int argc, char *argv[]) MAIN_EXTERNALLY_VISIBLE;
-int lpd_main(int argc UNUSED_PARAM, char *argv[])
+int lpd_main(int argc, char **argv) MAIN_EXTERNALLY_VISIBLE;
+int lpd_main(int argc UNUSED_PARAM, char **argv)
 {
 	int spooling = spooling; // for compiler
 	char *s, *queue;
diff --git a/printutils/lpr.c b/printutils/lpr.c
index 77d1a79a4..d40d0a67c 100644
--- a/printutils/lpr.c
+++ b/printutils/lpr.c
@@ -78,8 +78,8 @@ static void get_response_or_say_and_die(int fd, const char *errmsg)
 	}
 }
 
-int lpqr_main(int argc, char *argv[]) MAIN_EXTERNALLY_VISIBLE;
-int lpqr_main(int argc UNUSED_PARAM, char *argv[])
+int lpqr_main(int argc, char **argv) MAIN_EXTERNALLY_VISIBLE;
+int lpqr_main(int argc UNUSED_PARAM, char **argv)
 {
 	enum {
 		OPT_P           = 1 << 0, // -P queue[@host[:port]]. If no -P is given use $PRINTER, then "lp at localhost:515"
diff --git a/shell/match.c b/shell/match.c
index 90f77546d..8024f2747 100644
--- a/shell/match.c
+++ b/shell/match.c
@@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ char* FAST_FUNC scan_and_match(char *string, const char *pattern, unsigned flags
 }
 
 #ifdef STANDALONE
-int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+int main(int argc, char **argv)
 {
 	char *string;
 	char *op;

From vda.linux at googlemail.com  Mon May  2 10:28:48 2022
From: vda.linux at googlemail.com (Denys Vlasenko)
Date: Mon, 2 May 2022 12:28:48 +0200
Subject: [git commit] crond: implement support for setting PATH in crontab
 files
Message-ID: <20220502101852.EDAC084C4D@busybox.osuosl.org>

commit: https://git.busybox.net/busybox/commit/?id=52a7bf6fa677abdb80f8e484f6ba77ed3d34e444
branch: https://git.busybox.net/busybox/commit/?id=refs/heads/master

It's very inconvenient for a cron user not to be able to set a
"personal" PATH for their cron jobs, as is possible with other crons

function                                             old     new   delta
load_crontab                                         868     942     +74
.rodata                                           104878  104884      +6
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
(add/remove: 0/0 grow/shrink: 2/0 up/down: 80/0)               Total: 80 bytes

Signed-off-by: Paul Fox <pgf at foxharp.boston.ma.us>
Signed-off-by: Denys Vlasenko <vda.linux at googlemail.com>
---
 miscutils/crond.c | 23 ++++++++++++++++-------
 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

diff --git a/miscutils/crond.c b/miscutils/crond.c
index 1965af656..bd43c6b68 100644
--- a/miscutils/crond.c
+++ b/miscutils/crond.c
@@ -125,6 +125,7 @@ typedef struct CronLine {
 	char *cl_mailto;                /* whom to mail results, may be NULL */
 #endif
 	char *cl_shell;
+	char *cl_path;
 	/* ordered by size, not in natural order. makes code smaller: */
 	char cl_Dow[7];                 /* 0-6, beginning sunday */
 	char cl_Mons[12];               /* 0-11 */
@@ -421,6 +422,7 @@ static void load_crontab(const char *fileName)
 	char *mailTo = NULL;
 #endif
 	char *shell = NULL;
+	char *path = NULL;
 
 	delete_cronfile(fileName);
 
@@ -470,7 +472,12 @@ static void load_crontab(const char *fileName)
 				shell = xstrdup(&tokens[0][6]);
 				continue;
 			}
-//TODO: handle HOME= too? "man crontab" says:
+			if (is_prefixed_with(tokens[0], "PATH=")) {
+				free(path);
+				path = xstrdup(&tokens[0][5]);
+				continue;
+			}
+//TODO: handle HOME= too? Better yet, handle arbitrary ENVVARs? "man crontab" says:
 //name = value
 //
 //where the spaces around the equal-sign (=) are optional, and any subsequent
@@ -480,8 +487,8 @@ static void load_crontab(const char *fileName)
 //
 //Several environment variables are set up automatically by the cron(8) daemon.
 //SHELL is set to /bin/sh, and LOGNAME and HOME are set from the /etc/passwd
-//line of the crontab's owner. HOME and SHELL may be overridden by settings
-//in the crontab; LOGNAME may not.
+//line of the crontab's owner.  HOME, SHELL, and PATH may be overridden by
+//settings in the crontab; LOGNAME may not.
 
 #if ENABLE_FEATURE_CROND_SPECIAL_TIMES
 			if (tokens[0][0] == '@') {
@@ -567,6 +574,7 @@ static void load_crontab(const char *fileName)
 			line->cl_mailto = xstrdup(mailTo);
 #endif
 			line->cl_shell = xstrdup(shell);
+			line->cl_path = xstrdup(path);
 			/* copy command */
 			line->cl_cmd = xstrdup(tokens[5]);
 			pline = &line->cl_next;
@@ -653,21 +661,22 @@ static void safe_setenv(char **pvar_val, const char *var, const char *val)
 }
 #endif
 
-static void set_env_vars(struct passwd *pas, const char *shell)
+static void set_env_vars(struct passwd *pas, const char *shell, const char *path)
 {
 	/* POSIX requires crond to set up at least HOME, LOGNAME, PATH, SHELL.
-	 * We assume crond inherited suitable PATH.
 	 */
 #if SETENV_LEAKS
 	safe_setenv(&G.env_var_logname, "LOGNAME", pas->pw_name);
 	safe_setenv(&G.env_var_user, "USER", pas->pw_name);
 	safe_setenv(&G.env_var_home, "HOME", pas->pw_dir);
 	safe_setenv(&G.env_var_shell, "SHELL", shell);
+	if (path) safe_setenv(&G.env_var_shell, "PATH", path);
 #else
 	xsetenv("LOGNAME", pas->pw_name);
 	xsetenv("USER", pas->pw_name);
 	xsetenv("HOME", pas->pw_dir);
 	xsetenv("SHELL", shell);
+	if (path) xsetenv("PATH", path);
 #endif
 }
 
@@ -701,7 +710,7 @@ fork_job(const char *user, int mailFd, CronLine *line, bool run_sendmail)
 	shell = line->cl_shell ? line->cl_shell : G.default_shell;
 	prog = run_sendmail ? SENDMAIL : shell;
 
-	set_env_vars(pas, shell);
+	set_env_vars(pas, shell, NULL); /* don't use crontab's PATH for sendmail */
 
 	sv_logmode = logmode;
 	pid = vfork();
@@ -845,7 +854,7 @@ static pid_t start_one_job(const char *user, CronLine *line)
 
 	/* Prepare things before vfork */
 	shell = line->cl_shell ? line->cl_shell : G.default_shell;
-	set_env_vars(pas, shell);
+	set_env_vars(pas, shell, line->cl_path);
 
 	/* Fork as the user in question and run program */
 	pid = vfork();

From vda.linux at googlemail.com  Mon May  2 12:25:36 2022
From: vda.linux at googlemail.com (Denys Vlasenko)
Date: Mon, 2 May 2022 14:25:36 +0200
Subject: [git commit] tsort: new applet
Message-ID: <20220502121609.4356C84D90@busybox.osuosl.org>

commit: https://git.busybox.net/busybox/commit/?id=4642cf5b388bf60f6bea67ce3a5031d24bccd48a
branch: https://git.busybox.net/busybox/commit/?id=refs/heads/master

function                                             old     new   delta
tsort_main                                             -     578    +578
.rodata                                           104884  104906     +22
applet_names                                        2759    2765      +6
applet_main                                         1596    1600      +4
packed_usage                                       34290   34288      -2
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
(add/remove: 2/0 grow/shrink: 3/1 up/down: 610/-2)            Total: 608 bytes

Signed-off-by: David Leonard <d+busybox at adaptive-enterprises.com>
Signed-off-by: Denys Vlasenko <vda.linux at googlemail.com>
---
 coreutils/tsort.c          | 188 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 docs/posix_conformance.txt |   2 +-
 testsuite/tsort.tests      | 110 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 3 files changed, 299 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/coreutils/tsort.c b/coreutils/tsort.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..dedb65b15
--- /dev/null
+++ b/coreutils/tsort.c
@@ -0,0 +1,188 @@
+/* vi: set sw=4 ts=4: */
+/*
+ * tsort implementation for busybox
+ *
+ * public domain -- David Leonard, 2022
+ */
+//config:config TSORT
+//config:	bool "tsort (0.7 kb)"
+//config:	default y
+//config:	help
+//config:	tsort performs a topological sort.
+
+//applet:IF_TSORT(APPLET(tsort, BB_DIR_USR_BIN, BB_SUID_DROP))
+
+//kbuild:lib-$(CONFIG_TSORT) += tsort.o
+
+/* BB_AUDIT SUSv3 compliant */
+/* http://www.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/007904975/utilities/tsort.html */
+
+//usage:#define tsort_trivial_usage
+//usage:       "[FILE]"
+//usage:#define tsort_full_usage "\n\n"
+//usage:       "Topological sort"
+//usage:#define tsort_example_usage
+//usage:       "$ echo -e \"a b\\nb c\" | tsort\n"
+//usage:       "a\n"
+//usage:       "b\n"
+//usage:       "c\n"
+
+#include "libbb.h"
+#include "common_bufsiz.h"
+
+struct node {
+	unsigned in_count;
+	unsigned out_count;
+	struct node **out;
+	char name[1];
+};
+
+struct globals {
+	struct node **nodes;
+	unsigned nodes_len;
+};
+#define G (*(struct globals*)bb_common_bufsiz1)
+#define INIT_G() do { \
+	setup_common_bufsiz(); \
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(G) > COMMON_BUFSIZE); \
+	G.nodes = NULL; \
+	G.nodes_len = 0; \
+} while (0)
+
+static struct node *
+get_node(const char *name)
+{
+	struct node *n;
+	unsigned a = 0;
+	unsigned b = G.nodes_len;
+
+	/* Binary search for name */
+	while (a != b) {
+		unsigned m = (a + b) / 2;
+		int cmp = strcmp(name, G.nodes[m]->name);
+		if (cmp == 0)
+			return G.nodes[m]; /* found */
+		if (cmp < 0) {
+			b = m;
+		} else {
+			a = m + 1;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* Allocate new node */
+	n = xzalloc(sizeof(*n) + strlen(name));
+	//n->in_count = 0;
+	//n->out_count = 0;
+	//n->out = NULL;
+	strcpy(n->name, name);
+
+	/* Insert to maintain sort */
+	G.nodes = xrealloc(G.nodes, (G.nodes_len + 1) * sizeof(*G.nodes));
+	memmove(&G.nodes[a + 1], &G.nodes[a],
+		(G.nodes_len - a) * sizeof(*G.nodes));
+	G.nodes[a] = n;
+	G.nodes_len++;
+	return n;
+}
+
+static void
+add_edge(struct node *a, struct node *b)
+{
+	a->out = xrealloc_vector(a->out, 6, a->out_count);
+	a->out[a->out_count++] = b;
+	b->in_count++;
+}
+
+int tsort_main(int argc, char **argv) MAIN_EXTERNALLY_VISIBLE;
+int tsort_main(int argc UNUSED_PARAM, char **argv)
+{
+	char *line;
+	size_t linesz;
+	ssize_t len;
+	struct node *a;
+	int cycles;
+
+	INIT_G();
+
+	if (argv[1]) {
+		if (argv[2])
+			bb_show_usage();
+		if (NOT_LONE_DASH(argv[1])) {
+			close(STDIN_FILENO); /* == 0 */
+			xopen(argv[1], O_RDONLY); /* fd will be 0 */
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* Read in words separated by <blank>s */
+	a = NULL;
+	line = NULL;
+	linesz = 0;
+	while ((len = getline(&line, &linesz, stdin)) != -1) {
+		char *s = line;
+		while (*(s = skip_whitespace(s)) != '\0') {
+			struct node *b;
+			char *word;
+
+			word = s;
+			s = skip_non_whitespace(s);
+			if (*s)
+				*s++ = '\0';
+
+			/* Create nodes and edges for each word pair */
+			b = get_node(word);
+			if (!a) {
+				a = b;
+			} else {
+				if (a != b)
+					add_edge(a, b);
+				a = NULL;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+// Most other tools do not check for input read error (treat them as EOF)
+//	die_if_ferror(in, input_filename);
+	if (a)
+		bb_simple_error_msg_and_die("odd input");
+	free(line);
+
+	/*
+	 * Kahn's algorithm:
+	 *   - find a node that has no incoming edges, print and remove it
+	 *   - repeat until the graph is empty
+	 *   - if any nodes are left, they form cycles.
+	 */
+	cycles = 0;
+	while (G.nodes_len) {
+		struct node *n;
+		unsigned i;
+
+		/* Search for first node with no incoming edges */
+		for (i = 0; i < G.nodes_len; i++) {
+			if (!G.nodes[i]->in_count)
+				break;
+		}
+		if (i == G.nodes_len) {
+			/* Must be a cycle; arbitraily break it at node 0 */
+			cycles++;
+			i = 0;
+#ifndef TINY
+			bb_error_msg("cycle at %s", G.nodes[i]->name);
+#endif
+		}
+
+		/* Remove the node (need no longer maintain sort) */
+		n = G.nodes[i];
+		G.nodes[i] = G.nodes[--G.nodes_len];
+
+		/* And remove its outgoing edges */
+		for (i = 0; i < n->out_count; i++)
+			n->out[i]->in_count--;
+		free(n->out);
+
+		puts(n->name);
+		free(n);
+	}
+	free(G.nodes);
+
+	fflush_stdout_and_exit(cycles ? 1 : 0);
+}
diff --git a/docs/posix_conformance.txt b/docs/posix_conformance.txt
index 5e107d74d..8edbe3e15 100644
--- a/docs/posix_conformance.txt
+++ b/docs/posix_conformance.txt
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ POSIX Tools not supported:
   gencat, getconf, iconv, join, link, locale, localedef, lp, m4,
   mailx, newgrp, nl, pathchk, pax, pr, qalter, qdel, qhold, qmove,
   qmsg, qrerun, qrls, qselect, qsig, qstat, qsub, tabs, talk, tput,
-  tsort, unlink, uucp, uustat, uux
+  unlink, uucp, uustat, uux
 
 POSIX Tools not supported (DEVELOPMENT):
   admin, cflow, ctags, cxref, delta, fort77, get, lex, make, nm, prs, rmdel,
diff --git a/testsuite/tsort.tests b/testsuite/tsort.tests
new file mode 100755
index 000000000..c6fe78272
--- /dev/null
+++ b/testsuite/tsort.tests
@@ -0,0 +1,110 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+
+# SUSv3 compliant sort tests.
+# Public Domain, David Leonard 2022
+
+. ./testing.sh
+
+#       name cmd expected ./input stdin
+testing "" "tsort"       "a\n" "" "a a\n"
+testing "" "tsort -"     "a\n" "" "a a\n"
+testing "" "tsort input" "a\n" "a a\n" ""
+testing "tsort input (w/o eol)" "tsort input" "a\n" "a a" ""
+testing "" "tsort /dev/null" "" "" ""
+
+testing "tsort empty" tsort "" "" ""
+testing "tsort blank" tsort "" "" "\n"
+testing "tsort blanks" tsort "" "" "\n\n \t\n "
+
+# simple inputs having exactly one solution
+testing "tsort 1-edge" tsort "a\nb\n" "" "a b\n"
+testing "tsort 2-edge" tsort "a\nb\nc\n" "" "a b b c\n"
+
+
+# The following test helper accommodates future variable output because, as
+# tsort is allowed to emit any total ordering that satisfies its input,
+# should the implementation changes, these tests will remain valid.
+#
+# The idea is to verify that:
+# - each input word is present EXACTLY ONCE in tsort's output
+# - for each input pair 'a b', the occurrence of 'a' APPEARS BEFORE 'b'
+# - the exit code is 0
+
+tsort_test () {
+	fail=
+	name="$1"; shift
+	args="$*"
+	if [ $VERBOSE ]; then
+		echo "============"
+		echo "echo \"$args\" | tsort >actual"
+	fi
+	echo "$args" | tsort >actual
+	ec=$?
+	if [ $ec -ne 0 ]; then
+		fail "tsort exit $ec, expected 0"
+	fi
+	while [ $# -ne 0 ]; do
+		a=$1; shift
+		b=$1; shift
+		aline=$(grep -nxF "$a" <actual | cut -d: -f1)
+		bline=$(grep -nxF "$b" <actual | cut -d: -f1)
+		case $aline in
+			"") fail "word $a missing from output ($args)";;
+			*" "*) fail "word $a duplicated ($args)";;
+		esac
+		case $bline in
+			"") fail "word $b missing from output ($args)";;
+			*" "*) fail "word $b duplicated ($args)";;
+		esac
+		if [ $aline -gt $bline ]; then
+			fail "$a appears after $b ($args)"
+		fi
+	done
+	if [ $fail ] && [ $VERBOSE ]; then
+		echo "exit $ec, actual:"
+		cat actual
+	fi
+	rm actual
+	report "$name"
+}
+
+# Test that erroneous input causes an unsuccessful exit code
+# we don't test the output error message
+tsort_test_err () {
+	fail=
+	name="$1"; shift
+	echo "$*" | tsort >/dev/null 2>/dev/null
+	ec=$?
+	if [ $ec -eq 0 ]; then
+		fail "$name: unexpected exit 0 ($*)"
+	fi
+	report "$name"
+}
+
+fail () {
+	[ $VERBOSE ] && echo "ERROR: $*"
+	fail=1
+}
+
+report () {
+	if [ $fail ]; then
+		FAILCOUNT=$(($FAILCOUNT + 1))
+		echo "FAIL: $*"
+	else
+		echo "PASS: $*"
+	fi
+}
+
+tsort_test "tsort empty2"
+tsort_test "tsort singleton"    a a
+tsort_test "tsort simple"       a b b c
+tsort_test "tsort 2singleton"   a a b b
+tsort_test "tsort medium"       a b a b b c
+tsort_test "tsort std.example"  a b c c d e g g f g e f h h
+tsort_test "tsort prefixes"     a aa aa aaa aaaa aaaaa a aaaaa
+
+tsort_test_err "tsort odd"      a
+tsort_test_err "tsort odd2"     a b c
+tsort_test_err "tsort cycle"    a b b a
+
+exit $FAILCOUNT

From vda.linux at googlemail.com  Mon May  2 12:47:53 2022
From: vda.linux at googlemail.com (Denys Vlasenko)
Date: Mon, 2 May 2022 14:47:53 +0200
Subject: [git commit] init: do not set HOME
Message-ID: <20220502123745.2631E84DBE@busybox.osuosl.org>

commit: https://git.busybox.net/busybox/commit/?id=1a290f889c5103d867ba1e0715ae730b394a3a12
branch: https://git.busybox.net/busybox/commit/?id=refs/heads/master

function                                             old     new   delta
.rodata                                           104906  104899      -7
init_main                                            786     776     -10
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
(add/remove: 0/0 grow/shrink: 0/2 up/down: 0/-17)             Total: -17 bytes

Signed-off-by: Denys Vlasenko <vda.linux at googlemail.com>
---
 init/init.c | 6 +++++-
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/init/init.c b/init/init.c
index 785a3b460..1e1ce833d 100644
--- a/init/init.c
+++ b/init/init.c
@@ -1105,10 +1105,14 @@ int init_main(int argc UNUSED_PARAM, char **argv)
 	setsid();
 
 	/* Make sure environs is set to something sane */
-	putenv((char *) "HOME=/");
 	putenv((char *) bb_PATH_root_path);
 	putenv((char *) "SHELL=/bin/sh");
 	putenv((char *) "USER=root"); /* needed? why? */
+	/* Linux kernel sets HOME="/" when execing init,
+	 * and it can be overridden (but not unset?) on kernel's command line.
+	 * We used to set it to "/" here, but now we do not:
+	 */
+	//putenv((char *) "HOME=/");
 
 	if (argv[1])
 		xsetenv("RUNLEVEL", argv[1]);

From vda.linux at googlemail.com  Mon May  2 12:53:14 2022
From: vda.linux at googlemail.com (Denys Vlasenko)
Date: Mon, 2 May 2022 14:53:14 +0200
Subject: [git commit] seedrng: it's not a part of util-linux, move to miscutils
Message-ID: <20220502124325.E1BBE84DC6@busybox.osuosl.org>

commit: https://git.busybox.net/busybox/commit/?id=5ba56e8b95ea84dbd7c0f7adfb9bdb1740480904
branch: https://git.busybox.net/busybox/commit/?id=refs/heads/master

Signed-off-by: Denys Vlasenko <vda.linux at googlemail.com>
---
 {util-linux => miscutils}/seedrng.c | 0
 1 file changed, 0 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)

diff --git a/util-linux/seedrng.c b/miscutils/seedrng.c
similarity index 100%
rename from util-linux/seedrng.c
rename to miscutils/seedrng.c

From vda.linux at googlemail.com  Mon May  2 13:03:32 2022
From: vda.linux at googlemail.com (Denys Vlasenko)
Date: Mon, 2 May 2022 15:03:32 +0200
Subject: [git commit] seedrng: restore error check on fsync
Message-ID: <20220502125351.5D30784DF3@busybox.osuosl.org>

commit: https://git.busybox.net/busybox/commit/?id=3bfbcb5807ec43b6470bd7bb3e3ca0375ed16544
branch: https://git.busybox.net/busybox/commit/?id=refs/heads/master

Or else security people will never stop nagging us.

function                                             old     new   delta
seedrng_main                                         884     906     +22

Signed-off-by: Denys Vlasenko <vda.linux at googlemail.com>
---
 miscutils/seedrng.c | 21 ++++++++++++---------
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)

diff --git a/miscutils/seedrng.c b/miscutils/seedrng.c
index 8c81835f6..4f2441abc 100644
--- a/miscutils/seedrng.c
+++ b/miscutils/seedrng.c
@@ -134,12 +134,14 @@ static void seed_from_file_if_exists(const char *filename, int dfd, bool credit,
 		/* We are going to use this data to seed the RNG:
 		 * we believe it to genuinely containing entropy.
 		 * If this just-unlinked file survives
-		 * (e.g. if machine crashes _right now_)
+		 * (if machine crashes before deletion is recorded on disk)
 		 * and we reuse it after reboot, this assumption
-		 * would be violated. Fsync the directory to
-		 * make sure file is gone:
+		 * would be violated, and RNG may end up generating
+		 * the same data. fsync the directory
+		 * to make sure file is gone:
 		 */
-		fsync(dfd);
+		if (fsync(dfd) != 0)
+			bb_simple_perror_msg_and_die("I/O error");
 
 //Length is not random, and taking its address spills variable to stack
 //		sha256_hash(hash, &seed_len, sizeof(seed_len));
@@ -210,10 +212,11 @@ int seedrng_main(int argc UNUSED_PARAM, char **argv)
 	sha256_hash(&hash, &timestamp, sizeof(timestamp));
 
 	for (i = 0; i <= 1; i++) {
-		seed_from_file_if_exists(i == 0 ? NON_CREDITABLE_SEED_NAME : CREDITABLE_SEED_NAME,
-					dfd,
-					/* credit? */ (opts ^ OPT_n) & i, /* 0, then 1 unless -n */
-					&hash);
+		seed_from_file_if_exists(
+			i == 0 ? NON_CREDITABLE_SEED_NAME : CREDITABLE_SEED_NAME,
+			dfd,
+			/*credit?*/ (opts ^ OPT_n) & i, /* 0, then 1 unless -n */
+			&hash);
 	}
 
 	new_seed_len = determine_optimal_seed_len();
@@ -224,7 +227,7 @@ int seedrng_main(int argc UNUSED_PARAM, char **argv)
 	sha256_end(&hash, new_seed + new_seed_len - SHA256_OUTSIZE);
 
 	printf("Saving %u bits of %screditable seed for next boot\n",
-			(unsigned)new_seed_len * 8, new_seed_creditable ? "" : "non-");
+		(unsigned)new_seed_len * 8, new_seed_creditable ? "" : "non-");
 	fd = xopen3(NON_CREDITABLE_SEED_NAME, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC, 0400);
 	xwrite(fd, new_seed, new_seed_len);
 	if (new_seed_creditable) {

From bugzilla at busybox.net  Mon May  2 21:22:13 2022
From: bugzilla at busybox.net (bugzilla at busybox.net)
Date: Mon, 02 May 2022 21:22:13 +0000
Subject: [Bug 14786] New: `xxd -r` introduces spurious bytes
Message-ID: <bug-14786-161@https.bugs.busybox.net/>

https://bugs.busybox.net/show_bug.cgi?id=14786

            Bug ID: 14786
           Summary: `xxd -r` introduces spurious bytes
           Product: Busybox
           Version: 1.34.x
          Hardware: All
                OS: Linux
            Status: NEW
          Severity: normal
          Priority: P5
         Component: Other
          Assignee: unassigned at busybox.net
          Reporter: bugz.vufd7 at aleeas.com
                CC: busybox-cvs at busybox.net
  Target Milestone: ---

Here's a sample hexdump, produced by xxd:

    $ cat > /tmp/encoded <<EOF
    00000000: 0001 0203 0405 0607 0809 0a0b 0c0d 0e0f  ................
    00000010: 1011 1213 1415 1617 1819 1a1b 1c1d 1e1f  ................
    00000020: 2021 2223 2425 2627 2829 2a2b 2c2d 2e2f   !"#$%&'()*+,-./
    00000030: 3031 3233 3435 3637 3839 3a3b 3c3d 3e3f  0123456789:;<=>?
    00000040: 40                                       @
    EOF

If I run `xxd -r`, I expect to get back the original, 65-byte binary file
represented by this hex dump. In other words, `xxd -r /tmp/encoded | xxd`
should produce exactly the same encoded representation.

It doesn't - `xxd -r` produces a *70*-byte file; 5 bytes have been added after
the 64th bit. Here's the full output:

    $ /bin/busybox xxd -r /tmp/encoded | xxd
    00000000: 0001 0203 0405 0607 0809 0a0b 0c0d 0e0f  ................
    00000010: 1011 1213 1415 1617 1819 1a1b 1c1d 1e1f  ................
    00000020: 2021 2223 2425 2627 2829 2a2b 2c2d 2e2f   !"#$%&'()*+,-./
    00000030: 3031 3233 3435 3637 3839 3a3b 3c3d 3e3f  0123456789:;<=>?
    00000040: 0123 4567 8940                           .#Eg.@
              ^^^^^^^^^^^^ extra bytes

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You are receiving this mail because:
You are on the CC list for the bug.

From bugzilla at busybox.net  Tue May  3 08:01:03 2022
From: bugzilla at busybox.net (bugzilla at busybox.net)
Date: Tue, 03 May 2022 08:01:03 +0000
Subject: [Bug 14786] `xxd -r` introduces spurious bytes
In-Reply-To: <bug-14786-161@https.bugs.busybox.net/>
References: <bug-14786-161@https.bugs.busybox.net/>
Message-ID: <bug-14786-161-2xl0jTjQiJ@https.bugs.busybox.net/>

https://bugs.busybox.net/show_bug.cgi?id=14786

--- Comment #1 from Rich <bugz.vufd7 at aleeas.com> ---
After further testing, I've found that BusyBox's xxd is copying the first
leading hex numerals out of the ASCII column. And it may be doing this because
it is not taking the value of the -c option into account - or that may be a
separate bug.

Here's another example, contrasted with the output of the stand-alone xxd
package.

    $ cat > sample << EOF
    00000000: 0100 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 00ff  deadbeef........
    EOF

BusyBox's reversed interpretation:

    $ /bin/busybox xxd -r -c2 sample | xxd
    00000000: 0100 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 00ff  ................
    00000010: dead beef                                ....

Details of stand-alone package, and how it handles input by default:

    $ /usr/bin/xxd -v
    xxd 2022-01-14 by Juergen Weigert et al.

    $ /usr/bin/xxd -r sample | xxd
    00000000: 0100 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 00ff  ................

And how stand-alone package interprets the -c option:

    $ /usr/bin/xxd -r -c2 sample | xxd
    00000000: 0100                                     ..

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You are receiving this mail because:
You are on the CC list for the bug.

From vda.linux at googlemail.com  Tue May  3 10:48:50 2022
From: vda.linux at googlemail.com (Denys Vlasenko)
Date: Tue, 3 May 2022 12:48:50 +0200
Subject: [git commit] seedrng: do not hash in a constant string,
 it's not adding entropy
Message-ID: <20220503103847.C9A4A84EAD@busybox.osuosl.org>

commit: https://git.busybox.net/busybox/commit/?id=67fd6be0bb925839f4e6564dba741f9889b2fac8
branch: https://git.busybox.net/busybox/commit/?id=refs/heads/master

function                                             old     new   delta
seedrng_main                                         906     880     -26
.rodata                                           104899  104873     -26
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
(add/remove: 0/0 grow/shrink: 0/2 up/down: 0/-52)             Total: -52 bytes

Signed-off-by: Denys Vlasenko <vda.linux at googlemail.com>
---
 miscutils/seedrng.c | 16 ++++++++--------
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

diff --git a/miscutils/seedrng.c b/miscutils/seedrng.c
index 4f2441abc..967741dc7 100644
--- a/miscutils/seedrng.c
+++ b/miscutils/seedrng.c
@@ -169,7 +169,7 @@ int seedrng_main(int argc UNUSED_PARAM, char **argv)
 	uint8_t new_seed[MAX_SEED_LEN];
 	size_t new_seed_len;
 	bool new_seed_creditable;
-	struct timespec timestamp;
+	struct timespec timestamp[2];
 	sha256_ctx_t hash;
 
 	enum {
@@ -197,19 +197,19 @@ int seedrng_main(int argc UNUSED_PARAM, char **argv)
 	 * Avoid concurrent runs by taking a blocking lock on the directory.
 	 * Not checking for errors. Looking at manpage,
 	 * ENOLCK "The kernel ran out of memory for allocating lock records"
-	 * seems to be the only one which is likely - and if that happens,
+	 * seems to be the only one which is possible - and if that happens,
 	 * machine is OOMing (much worse problem than inability to lock...).
 	 * Also, typically configured Linux machines do not fail GFP_KERNEL
 	 * allocations (they trigger memory reclaim instead).
 	 */
-	flock(dfd, LOCK_EX); /* would block while another copy runs */
+	flock(dfd, LOCK_EX); /* blocks while another instance runs */
 
 	sha256_begin(&hash);
-	sha256_hash(&hash, "SeedRNG v1 Old+New Prefix", 25);
-	clock_gettime(CLOCK_REALTIME, &timestamp);
-	sha256_hash(&hash, &timestamp, sizeof(timestamp));
-	clock_gettime(CLOCK_BOOTTIME, &timestamp);
-	sha256_hash(&hash, &timestamp, sizeof(timestamp));
+//Hashing in a constant string doesn't add any entropy
+//	sha256_hash(&hash, "SeedRNG v1 Old+New Prefix", 25);
+	clock_gettime(CLOCK_REALTIME, &timestamp[0]);
+	clock_gettime(CLOCK_BOOTTIME, &timestamp[1]);
+	sha256_hash(&hash, timestamp, sizeof(timestamp));
 
 	for (i = 0; i <= 1; i++) {
 		seed_from_file_if_exists(

From bugzilla at busybox.net  Wed May  4 21:04:21 2022
From: bugzilla at busybox.net (bugzilla at busybox.net)
Date: Wed, 04 May 2022 21:04:21 +0000
Subject: [Bug 14791] New: Feature Request: Busybox grep exclude compatibility
Message-ID: <bug-14791-161@https.bugs.busybox.net/>

https://bugs.busybox.net/show_bug.cgi?id=14791

            Bug ID: 14791
           Summary: Feature Request: Busybox grep exclude compatibility
           Product: Busybox
           Version: 1.35.x
          Hardware: All
                OS: Linux
            Status: NEW
          Severity: normal
          Priority: P5
         Component: Other
          Assignee: unassigned at busybox.net
          Reporter: Synper311 at aol.com
                CC: busybox-cvs at busybox.net
  Target Milestone: ---

GNU grep documentation:  
https://www.gnu.org/software/grep/manual/grep.html#index-_002d_002dexclude

This would allow scripts and programs relying upon this grep feature to work
smoothly with Busybox grep to exclude resuls, files, and/or directories that
match the exclude filter.

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From vda.linux at googlemail.com  Tue May 10 10:56:28 2022
From: vda.linux at googlemail.com (Denys Vlasenko)
Date: Tue, 10 May 2022 12:56:28 +0200
Subject: [git commit] top: fix display of large PID/PPID
Message-ID: <20220510114054.29F1085B74@busybox.osuosl.org>

commit: https://git.busybox.net/busybox/commit/?id=294881d2e9ab014f918fba63c01a629906508515
branch: https://git.busybox.net/busybox/commit/?id=refs/heads/master

function                                             old     new   delta
display_process_list                                1077    1191    +114
.rodata                                           104803  104807      +4
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
(add/remove: 0/0 grow/shrink: 2/0 up/down: 118/0)             Total: 118 bytes

Signed-off-by: Denys Vlasenko <vda.linux at googlemail.com>
---
 procps/top.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 28 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/procps/top.c b/procps/top.c
index 804d6f258..15222f570 100644
--- a/procps/top.c
+++ b/procps/top.c
@@ -608,6 +608,8 @@ static NOINLINE void display_process_list(int lines_rem, int scr_width)
 		BITS_PER_INT = sizeof(int) * 8
 	};
 
+	char ppubuf[sizeof(int)*3 * 2 + 12];
+	int n;
 	top_status_t *s;
 	unsigned long total_memory = display_header(scr_width, &lines_rem); /* or use total_vsz? */
 	/* xxx_shift and xxx_scale variables allow us to replace
@@ -699,12 +701,36 @@ static NOINLINE void display_process_list(int lines_rem, int scr_width)
 
 		smart_ulltoa5(s->vsz, vsz_str_buf, " mgtpezy");
 		/* PID PPID USER STAT VSZ %VSZ [%CPU] COMMAND */
+		n = sprintf(ppubuf, "%5u %5u %-8.8s", s->pid, s->ppid, get_cached_username(s->uid));
+		if (n != 6+6+8) {
+			/* Format PID PPID USER part into 6+6+8 chars:
+			 * shrink PID/PPID if possible, then truncate USER
+			 */
+			char *pp, *p = ppubuf;
+			if (*p == ' ') {
+				do
+					p++, n--;
+				while (n != 6+6+8 && *p == ' ');
+				overlapping_strcpy(ppubuf, p); /* shrink PID */
+				if (n == 6+6+8)
+					goto shortened;
+			}
+			pp = p = skip_non_whitespace(ppubuf) + 1;
+			if (*p == ' ') {
+				do
+					p++, n--;
+				while (n != 6+6+8 && *p == ' ');
+				overlapping_strcpy(pp, p); /* shrink PPID */
+			}
+			ppubuf[6+6+8] = '\0'; /* truncate USER */
+		}
+ shortened:
 		col = snprintf(line_buf, scr_width,
-				"\n" "%5u%6u %-8.8s %s  %.5s" FMT
+				"\n" "%s %s  %.5s" FMT
 				IF_FEATURE_TOP_SMP_PROCESS(" %3d")
 				IF_FEATURE_TOP_CPU_USAGE_PERCENTAGE(FMT)
 				" ",
-				s->pid, s->ppid, get_cached_username(s->uid),
+				ppubuf,
 				s->state, vsz_str_buf,
 				SHOW_STAT(pmem)
 				IF_FEATURE_TOP_SMP_PROCESS(, s->last_seen_on_cpu)

From vda.linux at googlemail.com  Tue May 10 11:51:09 2022
From: vda.linux at googlemail.com (Denys Vlasenko)
Date: Tue, 10 May 2022 13:51:09 +0200
Subject: [git commit] top: code shrink
Message-ID: <20220510114054.3726784E3D@busybox.osuosl.org>

commit: https://git.busybox.net/busybox/commit/?id=69f82e305b34aa35994b87f7ca6528abfbd73520
branch: https://git.busybox.net/busybox/commit/?id=refs/heads/master

function                                             old     new   delta
display_process_list                                1191    1186      -5

Signed-off-by: Denys Vlasenko <vda.linux at googlemail.com>
---
 procps/top.c | 25 ++++++++++++++-----------
 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)

diff --git a/procps/top.c b/procps/top.c
index 15222f570..5141feef1 100644
--- a/procps/top.c
+++ b/procps/top.c
@@ -608,8 +608,6 @@ static NOINLINE void display_process_list(int lines_rem, int scr_width)
 		BITS_PER_INT = sizeof(int) * 8
 	};
 
-	char ppubuf[sizeof(int)*3 * 2 + 12];
-	int n;
 	top_status_t *s;
 	unsigned long total_memory = display_header(scr_width, &lines_rem); /* or use total_vsz? */
 	/* xxx_shift and xxx_scale variables allow us to replace
@@ -691,6 +689,9 @@ static NOINLINE void display_process_list(int lines_rem, int scr_width)
 		lines_rem = ntop - G_scroll_ofs;
 	s = top + G_scroll_ofs;
 	while (--lines_rem >= 0) {
+		int n;
+		char *pp;
+		char ppubuf[sizeof(int)*3 * 2 + 12];
 		char vsz_str_buf[8];
 		unsigned col;
 
@@ -706,14 +707,15 @@ static NOINLINE void display_process_list(int lines_rem, int scr_width)
 			/* Format PID PPID USER part into 6+6+8 chars:
 			 * shrink PID/PPID if possible, then truncate USER
 			 */
-			char *pp, *p = ppubuf;
-			if (*p == ' ') {
-				do
-					p++, n--;
-				while (n != 6+6+8 && *p == ' ');
-				overlapping_strcpy(ppubuf, p); /* shrink PID */
-				if (n == 6+6+8)
-					goto shortened;
+			char *p;
+			pp = ppubuf;
+			if (*pp == ' ') {
+				do {
+					pp++, n--;
+					if (n == 6+6+8)
+						goto shortened;
+				} while (*pp == ' ');
+				overlapping_strcpy(ppubuf, pp); /* shrink PID */
 			}
 			pp = p = skip_non_whitespace(ppubuf) + 1;
 			if (*p == ' ') {
@@ -724,13 +726,14 @@ static NOINLINE void display_process_list(int lines_rem, int scr_width)
 			}
 			ppubuf[6+6+8] = '\0'; /* truncate USER */
 		}
+		pp = ppubuf;
  shortened:
 		col = snprintf(line_buf, scr_width,
 				"\n" "%s %s  %.5s" FMT
 				IF_FEATURE_TOP_SMP_PROCESS(" %3d")
 				IF_FEATURE_TOP_CPU_USAGE_PERCENTAGE(FMT)
 				" ",
-				ppubuf,
+				pp,
 				s->state, vsz_str_buf,
 				SHOW_STAT(pmem)
 				IF_FEATURE_TOP_SMP_PROCESS(, s->last_seen_on_cpu)

From vda.linux at googlemail.com  Tue May 10 12:04:34 2022
From: vda.linux at googlemail.com (Denys Vlasenko)
Date: Tue, 10 May 2022 14:04:34 +0200
Subject: [git commit] top: code shrink
Message-ID: <20220510115414.79E5F85C14@busybox.osuosl.org>

commit: https://git.busybox.net/busybox/commit/?id=1099a27696cd733041db97f99da4e22ecd2424e5
branch: https://git.busybox.net/busybox/commit/?id=refs/heads/master

function                                             old     new   delta
display_process_list                                1186    1168     -18

Signed-off-by: Denys Vlasenko <vda.linux at googlemail.com>
---
 procps/top.c | 20 +++++++++-----------
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)

diff --git a/procps/top.c b/procps/top.c
index 5141feef1..744f20e9b 100644
--- a/procps/top.c
+++ b/procps/top.c
@@ -690,7 +690,7 @@ static NOINLINE void display_process_list(int lines_rem, int scr_width)
 	s = top + G_scroll_ofs;
 	while (--lines_rem >= 0) {
 		int n;
-		char *pp;
+		char *ppu;
 		char ppubuf[sizeof(int)*3 * 2 + 12];
 		char vsz_str_buf[8];
 		unsigned col;
@@ -703,37 +703,35 @@ static NOINLINE void display_process_list(int lines_rem, int scr_width)
 		smart_ulltoa5(s->vsz, vsz_str_buf, " mgtpezy");
 		/* PID PPID USER STAT VSZ %VSZ [%CPU] COMMAND */
 		n = sprintf(ppubuf, "%5u %5u %-8.8s", s->pid, s->ppid, get_cached_username(s->uid));
+		ppu = ppubuf;
 		if (n != 6+6+8) {
 			/* Format PID PPID USER part into 6+6+8 chars:
 			 * shrink PID/PPID if possible, then truncate USER
 			 */
-			char *p;
-			pp = ppubuf;
-			if (*pp == ' ') {
+			char *p, *pp;
+			if (*ppu == ' ') {
 				do {
-					pp++, n--;
+					ppu++, n--;
 					if (n == 6+6+8)
 						goto shortened;
-				} while (*pp == ' ');
-				overlapping_strcpy(ppubuf, pp); /* shrink PID */
+				} while (*ppu == ' ');
 			}
-			pp = p = skip_non_whitespace(ppubuf) + 1;
+			pp = p = skip_non_whitespace(ppu) + 1;
 			if (*p == ' ') {
 				do
 					p++, n--;
 				while (n != 6+6+8 && *p == ' ');
 				overlapping_strcpy(pp, p); /* shrink PPID */
 			}
-			ppubuf[6+6+8] = '\0'; /* truncate USER */
+			ppu[6+6+8] = '\0'; /* truncate USER */
 		}
-		pp = ppubuf;
  shortened:
 		col = snprintf(line_buf, scr_width,
 				"\n" "%s %s  %.5s" FMT
 				IF_FEATURE_TOP_SMP_PROCESS(" %3d")
 				IF_FEATURE_TOP_CPU_USAGE_PERCENTAGE(FMT)
 				" ",
-				pp,
+				ppu,
 				s->state, vsz_str_buf,
 				SHOW_STAT(pmem)
 				IF_FEATURE_TOP_SMP_PROCESS(, s->last_seen_on_cpu)

From vda.linux at googlemail.com  Thu May 12 09:07:12 2022
From: vda.linux at googlemail.com (Denys Vlasenko)
Date: Thu, 12 May 2022 11:07:12 +0200
Subject: [git commit] examples/var_service/dhcp_if: make helper scripts more
 talkative
Message-ID: <20220512085645.E094985AAC@busybox.osuosl.org>

commit: https://git.busybox.net/busybox/commit/?id=b9c2108b26ad1fe4634c250850a4abadff26c76e
branch: https://git.busybox.net/busybox/commit/?id=refs/heads/master

Signed-off-by: Denys Vlasenko <vda.linux at googlemail.com>
---
 examples/var_service/dhcp_if/convert2ipconf  | 16 ++++++++++++----
 examples/var_service/dhcp_if/convert2ntpconf |  2 +-
 examples/var_service/dhcp_if/dhcp_handler    |  6 ++----
 examples/var_service/dhcp_if/finish          |  2 +-
 4 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)

diff --git a/examples/var_service/dhcp_if/convert2ipconf b/examples/var_service/dhcp_if/convert2ipconf
index 31e3c7fde..98f6546bf 100755
--- a/examples/var_service/dhcp_if/convert2ipconf
+++ b/examples/var_service/dhcp_if/convert2ipconf
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@
 #let cfg=cfg+1
 #if[$cfg]=...; ip[$cfg]=...; ipmask[$cfg]=.../...; gw[$cfg]=...; net[$cfg]=... dns[$cfg]=...
 
-exec >/dev/null
+#exec >/dev/null
 #exec >"$0.out"  # debug
 exec 2>&1
 
@@ -31,23 +31,31 @@ test "$ip" || exit 1
 if ! test "$mask"; then
 	case "$ip" in
 	10.*)
+		echo "mask assumed 8 for ip=$ip"
 		mask=8;;
-	192.168.*)
-		mask=16;;
 	#172.16-31.x.x
 	172.1[6789].*)
+		echo "mask assumed 12 for ip=$ip"
 		mask=12;;
 	172.2[0123456789].*)
+		echo "mask assumed 12 for ip=$ip"
 		mask=12;;
 	172.3[01].*)
+		echo "mask assumed 12 for ip=$ip"
 		mask=12;;
+	192.168.*)
+		echo "mask assumed 16 for ip=$ip"
+		mask=16;;
 	esac
 fi
 
 # some servers do not return router option.
 # assume DHCP server is the router.
 if ! test "$router"; then
-	test "$serverid" && router="$serverid"
+	if test "$serverid"; then
+		router="$serverid"
+		echo "No 'router' from the server, assuming 'serverid' is the router: $serverid"
+	fi
 fi
 
 {
diff --git a/examples/var_service/dhcp_if/convert2ntpconf b/examples/var_service/dhcp_if/convert2ntpconf
index e9d829308..f51740ba0 100755
--- a/examples/var_service/dhcp_if/convert2ntpconf
+++ b/examples/var_service/dhcp_if/convert2ntpconf
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@
 #let cfg=cfg+1
 #ntpip[$cfg]=...
 
-exec >/dev/null
+#exec >/dev/null
 #exec >"$0.out"  # debug
 exec 2>&1
 
diff --git a/examples/var_service/dhcp_if/dhcp_handler b/examples/var_service/dhcp_if/dhcp_handler
index 6a97e8543..3e652621d 100755
--- a/examples/var_service/dhcp_if/dhcp_handler
+++ b/examples/var_service/dhcp_if/dhcp_handler
@@ -38,12 +38,10 @@ file_ntpconf="$service.ntpconf"
 dir_ipconf="/var/run/service/fw"
 dir_ntpconf="/var/run/service/ntpd"
 
-exec >/dev/null
-#exec >>"$0.out"  #debug
+#exec >/dev/null
+#exec >"$0.out"  #debug
 exec 2>&1
 
-echo "`date`: Params: $*"
-
 if test x"$1" != x"bound" && test x"$1" != x"renew" ; then
 	# Reconfigure network with this interface disabled
 	echo "Deconfiguring"
diff --git a/examples/var_service/dhcp_if/finish b/examples/var_service/dhcp_if/finish
index 8ce188336..50bfe67b5 100755
--- a/examples/var_service/dhcp_if/finish
+++ b/examples/var_service/dhcp_if/finish
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 #!/bin/sh
-# executed when service is taken down ("sv d .")
+# executed when service is taken down ("svc -d .")
 
 service=${PWD##*/}
 file_ipconf="$service.ipconf"

From vda.linux at googlemail.com  Thu May 12 09:44:47 2022
From: vda.linux at googlemail.com (Denys Vlasenko)
Date: Thu, 12 May 2022 11:44:47 +0200
Subject: [git commit] top: improve large PID display in memory ('s') mode
Message-ID: <20220512093441.ECA7785BF6@busybox.osuosl.org>

commit: https://git.busybox.net/busybox/commit/?id=8d67007a4dedef77dd0cf757bcc0e6fbee267ced
branch: https://git.busybox.net/busybox/commit/?id=refs/heads/master

function                                             old     new   delta
display_topmem_process_list                          530     564     +34

Signed-off-by: Denys Vlasenko <vda.linux at googlemail.com>
---
 procps/top.c | 5 ++++-
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/procps/top.c b/procps/top.c
index 744f20e9b..ff775422c 100644
--- a/procps/top.c
+++ b/procps/top.c
@@ -879,8 +879,11 @@ static NOINLINE void display_topmem_process_list(int lines_rem, int scr_width)
 		lines_rem = ntop - G_scroll_ofs;
 	while (--lines_rem >= 0) {
 		/* PID VSZ VSZRW RSS (SHR) DIRTY (SHR) COMMAND */
-		ulltoa6_and_space(s->pid     , &line_buf[0*6]);
+		int n = sprintf(line_buf, "%5u ", s->pid);
 		ulltoa6_and_space(s->vsz     , &line_buf[1*6]);
+		if (n > 7 || (n == 7 && line_buf[6] != ' '))
+			/* PID and VSZ are clumped together, truncate PID */
+			line_buf[5] = '.';
 		ulltoa6_and_space(s->vszrw   , &line_buf[2*6]);
 		ulltoa6_and_space(s->rss     , &line_buf[3*6]);
 		ulltoa6_and_space(s->rss_sh  , &line_buf[4*6]);

From bugzilla at busybox.net  Wed May 18 04:58:49 2022
From: bugzilla at busybox.net (bugzilla at busybox.net)
Date: Wed, 18 May 2022 04:58:49 +0000
Subject: [Bug 14806] New: Erasure of intermediate values in sha_crypt()
 removed due to compiler optimization
Message-ID: <bug-14806-161@https.bugs.busybox.net/>

https://bugs.busybox.net/show_bug.cgi?id=14806

            Bug ID: 14806
           Summary: Erasure of intermediate values in sha_crypt() removed
                    due to compiler optimization
           Product: Busybox
           Version: 1.35.x
          Hardware: All
                OS: Linux
            Status: NEW
          Severity: normal
          Priority: P5
         Component: Other
          Assignee: unassigned at busybox.net
          Reporter: yufeidu at cs.unc.edu
                CC: busybox-cvs at busybox.net
  Target Milestone: ---

Created attachment 9306
  --> https://bugs.busybox.net/attachment.cgi?id=9306&action=edit
.config file when building busybox

The SHA encrypt function sha_crypt() (located in pw_encrypt_sha.c) uses memset
to erase the intermediate results in both the stack object L and heap objects
key_data and salt_data before it returns. The comment above memset calls
indicates that these erasures are necessary to prevent information leaks.
However, when compiled with Clang 14 at O3 optimization, all 3 calls to memset
are removed due to the Dead Store Elimination optimization. As a result, the
intermediate results in L and part of the results in key_data may stay in
memory outside their scopes. 

Here is a snippet of the disassembly at O3 (with the corresponding C code
generated using "objdump -S"):
        memset(&L, 0, sizeof(L)); /* [alt]_ctx and XXX_result buffers */
        memset(key_data, 0, key_len); /* also p_bytes */
        memset(salt_data, 0, salt_len); /* also s_bytes */
        free(key_data);
  50d97e:       e8 d5 ad ef ff          call   408758 <free at plt>
        free(salt_data);
  50d983:       4c 89 ef                mov    %r13,%rdi
  50d986:       e8 cd ad ef ff          call   408758 <free at plt>

At the assembly level, there is no function call to memset.

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From bugzilla at busybox.net  Wed May 18 14:23:16 2022
From: bugzilla at busybox.net (bugzilla at busybox.net)
Date: Wed, 18 May 2022 14:23:16 +0000
Subject: [Bug 14811] New: networking/nslookup.c parse_reply() CVE-2022-28391
 patch query
Message-ID: <bug-14811-161@https.bugs.busybox.net/>

https://bugs.busybox.net/show_bug.cgi?id=14811

            Bug ID: 14811
           Summary: networking/nslookup.c parse_reply() CVE-2022-28391
                    patch query
           Product: Busybox
           Version: unspecified
          Hardware: All
                OS: Linux
            Status: NEW
          Severity: normal
          Priority: P5
         Component: Networking
          Assignee: unassigned at busybox.net
          Reporter: john.simner at atos.net
                CC: busybox-cvs at busybox.net
  Target Milestone: ---

Is BusyBox affected by CVE-2022-28391 (BusyBox networking/nslookup.c
parse_reply() Function DNS PTR Record Escape Sequence Handling Arbitrary
Command Execution) and  BusyBox networking/nslookup.c parse_reply() Function
DNS PTR Record Escape Sequence Handling Arbitrary Command Execution)?

If so, is there an official patch or update that fixes these vulnerabilities
from BusyBox rather than git.alpinelinux.org?

If
https://git.alpinelinux.org/aports/plain/main/busybox/0001-libbb-sockaddr2str-ensure-only-printable-characters-.patch
details a patch that can be applied to BusyBox, should the change from 
"xasprintf("%s:%s", host, serv);" to "xasprintf("%s:%s",
printable_string(host), serv);" also be applied to ...

#if ENABLE_FEATURE_IPV6
        if (sa->sa_family == AF_INET6) {
                if (strchr(host, ':')) /* heh, it's not a resolved hostname */
                        return xasprintf("[%s]:%s", host, serv);
                /*return xasprintf("%s:%s", host, serv);*/
                /* - fall through instead */
        }
#endif

Thanks for your assistance and look forward to your response.

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From bugzilla at busybox.net  Fri May 20 05:31:58 2022
From: bugzilla at busybox.net (bugzilla at busybox.net)
Date: Fri, 20 May 2022 05:31:58 +0000
Subject: [Bug 14781] A use-after-free in Busybox's awk applet leads to denial
 of service and possibly code execution when processing a crafted awk
 pattern in the copyvar function
In-Reply-To: <bug-14781-161@https.bugs.busybox.net/>
References: <bug-14781-161@https.bugs.busybox.net/>
Message-ID: <bug-14781-161-mzsiFfhnYL@https.bugs.busybox.net/>

https://bugs.busybox.net/show_bug.cgi?id=14781

--- Comment #1 from Steve Beattie <steve.beattie at canonical.com> ---
This issue was assigned CVE-2022-30065
(https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-30065).

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